The thread must be a minimum of 200-250 words. MINIMUM OF TWO SOURCES BESIDES THE TEXTBOOK. Must cite at least 2 sources in addition to the Bible.
TEXTBOOK: Prunckun, H. (2019). Counterintelligence theory and practice (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Inc. ISBN: 9781786606884.
Ronczkowski, M. R. (2018). Terrorism and organized hate crime. (4th ed.). Boca Raton FL: Taylor & Francis (CRC Press). ISBN: 9781138703469.
Defensive Counterintelligence Planning: Prunckun (2019) describes how a strong and robust defensive counterintelligence planning strategy revolves around six key principles, however, adaptations and modifications might be necessary. The formula begins with identifying and locating sensitive information in need of protection, Melendez (2019) contends that U.S. naval data like missile launch codes serve as an example of sensitive information. Second, Prunckun (2019), cites that identifying the threat agent is imperative, Melendez (2019) naval study investigated which terrorist organizations might attempt to acquire and utilize launch codes, citing the Taliban or jihadist extremists. Third, Prunckun (2019), explains how agencies must explore weaknesses or vulnerabilities to the threat, Melendez (2019) describes this in the U.S. Navy’s sheer size and screening process, exclaiming that terrorists could insert themselves into the military organization essentially slipping through the cracks. Fourth, Prunckun (2019), states that gauging the likelihood of an attack establishes a realistic framework for threat management. Melendez (2019) investigated this likelihood in the U.S. Navy fleet, indicating that well-armed ships at sea are a difficult target for terrorists. Fifth, Prunckun (2019), talks about the potential consequences a threat could have, clearly for Melendez (2019) terrorists acquiring launch codes, access to missiles, or a Navy boat would be severely adverse. Lastly, Prunckun (2019), suggests constructing a PPRR plan, a prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plan. Melendez (2019) supports this notion, arguing that launch codes are sacred to the Navy requiring daily steps to prevent access, and preparedness initiatives to stop terrorists from gaining entry to U.S. Naval ships. Finally, Melendez (2019) claims that an armed response must be immediate, forceful, and solely intent on recovering any lost assets, utilization of special forces, seals, or delta being pertinent.
Logical Model for Threat: Prunckun (2019) begins with four board categories and two attributes for subcategories to best explain how a logical model for threat analysis is conducted, first desire, expectation, knowledge, and resources, then intent and capability. Wenjun & Lagerstrom (2019) explored threat models in cyber security, enhancing Prunckun (2019) breakdown of the logical approach. Wenjum & Lagerstrom (2019) concluded that hackers must first have the desire to commit crimes upon others before their capability to do so is imperative. Prunckun (2019) placed expectation or ability to commit such crimes into this broad category, as Wenjum & Lagerstrom (2019) confirmed, an unskilled hacker is not very dangerous. Subject matter experts describe knowledge according to Prunckun (2019), for example, a hacker who specializes in cryptocurrency will be relatively ineffective at infiltrating launch codes for a U.S. Navy vessel (Melendez, 2019). Lastly, accessibility to resources plays an interval part, Wenjum & Lagerstrom (2019), depicted the unfunded but highly skilled hacker who lacks financial support.
Defensive Counterintelligence Domains: Prunckun (2019) denotes four main defensive counterintelligence domains physical, personnel, information, and communication security to evaluate for a comprehensive strategy. Physical barriers, exemplify the purpose of counterintelligence domains, creating a visible structure to deter threats, attacks, or the idea of (Miller, 2019). Prunckun (2019) contends that examples like security doors, windows, checkpoints, safes, and CCTV loosely describe physical barriers and their wide-ranging impact on defensive counterintelligence efforts. Miller (2019) endorsed this mentality by explaining how the wall across the U.S.-Mexico border is more than just a wall, symbolizing, through a physical barrier, that America will not be taken advantage of by illegal immigrants. This student-researcher believes adamantly that a visible, impregnable, physical barrier has, and will always, represent the strongest form of deterrence amongst adversaries (Miller, 2019).
The inclusion of the remaining three defensive counterintelligence domains beings with personnel security measures, Prunckun (2019) identifies people specific strategies like background checks, training, and citizenship as intervals. To fully trust and accept any person in the sensitive community of a U.S. federal agency’s house, a personalized background check interviewing neighbors, family, and previous employers proves worthwhile (Prunckun, 2019). Information security, the third item, accounts for an individual’s accessibility to big data, commonly described as security clearance (Prunckun, 2019). The process of vetting or evaluating a person’s potential security is similar to the personnel security process, for example, significant background checks, diving into social media, personal preferences, and bank records, summarize the tip of the iceberg (Prunckun, 2019). Lastly, communication security rounds out the list, Prunckun (2019) shows how telephone lines, digital encryption, and satellites encompass the protection of sensitive information transferred between parties. To help encapsulate this notion the Bible’s endlessly vital passages are called upon, “A wicked messenger falls into trouble, but a faithful envoy brings healing” (English Standard Version, 2001/2016 Proverbs 13:17).
English Standard Version. (2016). Bible hub. Retrieved from https://biblehub.comLinks to an external site. (Original
work published 2001).
Melendez, V. (2019). Counterintelligence: An Asymmetrical Warfighting Tool for the U.S.
Navy. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. 32(4).
https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2019.1621108Links to an external site.
Miller, T. (2019). More Than a Wall. Transnational Institute.
https://desinformemonos.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/More-than-a-wall-report.pdfLinks to an external site.
Prunckun, H. (2019). Counter-Intelligence; Theory and Practice. Rowman & Littlefield
Publishing. Lanham, Maryland.
Wenjun, X., & Lagerstrom, R. (2019). Threat Modeling – A Systematic Literature Review.
Computers & Security. 84. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2019.03.010Links to an external site.